Abstract We studied the link between household membership in Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) and shortrun nutrition outcomes among children aged 5 years and younger. We used 2006 and 2010 survey data from Northern Ethiopia to estimate parameters of an exogenous switching regression. This allowed us to measure the differential impacts of household characteristics on the weight-for-height Z-scores of children in member and non-member households. The magnitude and significance of household covariates differed in samples of children from PSNP and non-PSNP households and the supply of female labour seemed to matter for promoting child health in member households. Controlling for a set of observable features of children and households we found that children in member households had weight-for-height Z-scores that were 0.55 points higher than those of children in non-member households. We conclude that the PSNP is providing positive short-term nutritional benefits for children, especially in those households that are able to leverage underemployed female labor.
Introduction
In this paper we use data from Northern Ethiopia to study the links between a social protection program and child nutrition. Child malnutrition is one of the many challenges that pose a threat to economic growth in developing countries. It undermines educational attainment, lowers non-cognitive skills, leads to low labor productivity during adulthood, and diverts attention and resources away from other development objectives (Kimhi 2003; World Bank 2010 ; Save the Children 2012; Dercon and Sanchez 2013) . Ultimately, under-nutrition during childhood can lead to intergenerational poverty (World Bank 2010) . To tackle the problem of malnutrition in poor nations, a number of targeted interventions have emerged. These include school feeding programs and micro-nutrient and vitamin supplementation programs for women and young children (Save the Children 2012). A broader approach is the provision of food aid. Ethiopia has a long history of receiving food aid (Gilligan et al. 2009a ), yet the country's record of child malnourishment remains poor and rates of malnutrition are among the highest in Africa (Christiaensen and Alderman 2004) . In 2005, the government of Ethiopia established the largest social protection program in Sub-Saharan Africa to date (outside of South Africa). The Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) built upon a previous emergency food aid program and included as components food-for-work (FFW) and cash-for-work (CFW) as well as direct support through free food. The PSNP has differed from Ethiopia's previous interventions by providing individual member households a guaranteed source of income for at least five consecutive years (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) for initial members), and in the majority of cases guaranteed income for an additional five years (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (Government of Ethiopia 2009) . The program was extended in 2015. 1 We use the terms Bhealth^and Bnutrition^interchangeably here.
To examine the impacts of the PSNP on child nutrition, we use anthropometric data collected in the Tigray region among children five years old and younger in 2006 and 2010. We conduct empirical analyses using pooled cross section data from two survey rounds. Our outcome indicator was weightfor-height Z-score (WHZ), a short-term indicator which we constructed using the WHO's newly developed child growth standard. Two research questions motivated the analysis. First, we asked whether the determinants of WHZ differed between the population of children in PSNP households and those in non-PSNP households. Second, we tested whether PSNP membership was associated with subsequently higher Zscores for children in beneficiary households. Importantly, we moved beyond the traditional approach to measuring a potential impact Bwith^and Bwithout^an intervention, and searched for underlying conditioning mechanisms that may be driving differences in nutrition outcomes in the PSNP and non-PSNP samples. Such a refocusing of effort for impact evaluation has been most clearly articulated by Deaton (2010) . We found, for example, that a household's supply of female labor is one such factor, which conditions nutritional response to the food-for-work opportunity. This probably reflects the low economic and nutritional cost of participating for females, in light of the paucity of other off-farm opportunities.
Impact evaluation studies have documented that membership in the PSNP was associated with an increase in consumption (Gilligan et al. 2009a; Berhane et al. 2011b ) and tree holding (Andersson et al. 2011 ); a decrease in children's time spent on domestic work (Woldehanna 2009 ), a decrease in child labor hours devoted to public works ); and mixed effects on livestock holdings (Andersen et al. 2011; Gilligan et al. 2009b; Berhane et al. 2011b ). Hoddinott et al. (2012) found that higher levels of PSNP payments, combined with access to complementary food security programs, led to higher use of fertilizer and greater agricultural investments. Although the authors found mixed effects on yields, one might speculate that program participation led to greater food output. This could have led to increased household attention to agriculture and nutrition. In addition, agricultural intensification could have led to reallocation of resources, including labor, toward food and health provisioning, especially by women.
Past studies focusing on the relationship between food aid and child nutrition in Ethiopia have suggested a positive impact of food aid on weight-for-height (Quisumbing 2003) and linear growth (Yamano et al. 2005) . These earlier studies relied on data collected between 1994 and 1996, well before the start of the PSNP. Gilligan et al. (2009b) contributed to this literature by examining the impact of the newly introduced PSNP on child anthropometry in selected weredas (districts) in the Amhara region. They found that the program did not have a measurable influence on child nutrition, although they acknowledge that their work was partly constrained by limitations in available data. In contrast to the focus of the current paper, their analysis centered on households that received High Valued Food Baskets (HVFBs), which differ from standard PSNP payments. Moreover, they measured the early impacts of the program (in the period [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] ,which may have been insufficient to detect impacts on child health and nutrition. Building on this previous work, we make three contributions. One, we update and complement previous research using data collected in Tigray after the introduction of the PSNP. Two, we study the impact of the PSNP on child nutrition after the end of the first phase of the program, thereby covering a longer time period than previous studies. And three, we provide a wider perspective on the impacts of the standard PSNP package by measuring impacts on child nutrition. In the process, we used the new WHO growth standard, which provides the most accurate measure of child health in Ethiopia to date.
We used an exogenous switching regression framework to answer our research questions. Findings revealed that the determinants of short-run anthropometric outcomes differed between member and non-member households. In particular, the supply of female labor seems to matter for promoting child health in member households. We also found that while nutrition outcomes were better for female children in our sample of member households, vis-à-vis their non-PSNP cohorts, male children appeared to do better in non-member households. We used our regression results to examine differences in WHZ in member and non-member households, finding an average difference in WHZ of approximately 0.55 points. We also measured program treatment effects under a set of counterfactual conditions in which we equated the nutrition returns to characteristics of member and non-member households. Those results suggested that, after controlling for the differences in the profiles of member and non-member households, children in member households had higher WHZ, on average, than children in non-member households. We conclude that short-run nutrition outcomes, as measured by WHZ, have been responsive to PSNP membership and associated interventions.
Theoretical framework
At the outset, it is necessary to clarify key temporal considerations for our analysis because we have available both shortrun and long-run nutritional indicators but are only wellpositioned to measure program impacts arising in the recent wake of PSNP enrollment. Clearly, given a long enough observational history, it would be possible to isolate the longterm impacts of PSNP membership on child health, as expressed through a long-term indicator such as height-forage Z-score (HAZ). In our case, however, we strongly believe that HAZ is highly correlated with household status at the start of the PSNP, and therefore negatively correlated with program participation. Indeed, the data confirm that average HAZ is lower among PSNP members than non-members, suggesting the households selected for inclusion in the program contained children who were, at enrolment in the PSNP, no betternourished than those who were not included in the program, despite somewhat higher WHZ. In fact, if one acknowledges that stunting is a biological response to sustained health and nutrition insults, then higher WHZ in a stunted population is not unexpected.
In the absence of a realistic opportunity to separately identify the drivers of long-run malnutrition and program participation predicated on poverty, we set aside the notion of linking the PSNP to long-term nutrition outcomes. Instead, we focused our attention on WHZ, the more immediate nutrition indicator, as this is more likely to be sensitive to short-term program impacts and less likely to be contaminated by initial conditions influencing program enrollment. From a short-run perspective, a program such as Ethiopia's PSNP can affect a child's short-run nutritional status through multiple channels. First, if the program involves distribution of food (as in the case of the FFW and free food program components of the PSNP), it may directly increase household's short-run food availability, with potential immediate benefits to mothers and children (Yamano et al. 2005) . Second, in cases where the program provides wages or cash transfers, a household's income will rise, thereby improving the household's ability to purchase food and nutrition-enhancing items (Alderman et al. 2006) . Nevertheless, while a positive nutritional impact from a rise in income seems possible and even likely, the degree to which such transfers might boost nutrition depends upon several factors. These include the overall magnitude of the increase in income, the marginal propensity to consume calories or other health and nutrition goods and services out of cash income, and the extent to which actual expenditures are transformed into positive increments in health and nutrition. On the other hand, a work program that requires households to provide labor could have negative implications for a child's nutritional status by shifting effort away from health provisioning. Whether a work program has deleterious impacts depends on the labor situation of the household, especially female members of the household. To the extent a household has Bsurplus^labor, and hence a low opportunity cost of effort, work opportunities may not displace nutrition-producing activities. However, if household labor is scarce, if the overall nutritional demands of work are high, or if off-farm work leads household members to redirect labor away from activities that produce adult and child nutrition, negative impacts may arise. In short, as labor is an input to child health, but public works programs require labor contributions from household members, such programs introduce the potential for an income-nutrition tradeoff.
Membership in the PSNP could therefore increase or decrease health production and hence have either a positive or negative effect on child nutrition. A dynamic model of household production and consumption can be solved to show the relationship between PSNP and children's health outcome (see Appendix 1). A decline in health may occur if labor allocated to health provisioning falls in response to a reallocation of labor to other activities, thereby reducing health production by an amount more than the health improvements provided by income arising from the competing activity. On the other hand, an improvement in health could result from an increase in FFW income if it does not require substantial Bcost^in terms of reallocation of labor from health production. Because labor market rigidities preclude off-farm work for women, one might expect the shadow value of female labor to be artificially low inside the household. That is, the endogenous wage (implicit value) for their work within the household is low. In such a setting, a FFW program that makes use of female labor provides a potential means to generate gains for the household by reallocating small quantities of female labor. That is, outcomes may vary depending on whether new activities require the (re)allocation of male or female labor. Hence, the household's supply of female labor may influence the marginal nutrition benefit of a FFW program, providing a mechanism by which program impacts might differ across otherwise similar households (see Appendix 1 for the optimization result).
Whether, on net, FFW has a short-run positive or negative effect on child health depends on the deleterious effects of the reallocation of labor, the household's labor endowment, the size of the public works payment, and the marginal impact of this payment on child nutrition and health. If a household uses the payment on health production (either in terms of consuming food or consuming health and medical attention) children in PSNP households may enjoy better health than those in non-PSNP households, even when FFW labor requirements crowd out some agricultural or home activities. In this case, the benefit from PSNP may outweigh the deleterious effect of reallocation of labor. If, on the other hand, the household uses public works income for purposes unrelated to child health, this potentially undermines health production by displacing labor from health production without a compensatory expenditure on health provisioning. Moreover, the outcome may critically depend on whether it is male or female labor that is devoted to FFW, and whether that labor is relatively scarce in the household. The overall impact is, a priori, ambiguous.
Based on the theoretical framework, we pose two hypotheses. First, we hypothesize that determinants of nutritional outcomes will differ between households that are members of the PSNP and those that are not. Second, we hypothesize that children residing in PSNP households will have better nutritional outcomes because the opportunity cost of allocating labor to public works is likely to be low and the nutritional or cash income benefits obtained from participating in the program are likely to be high. Our subsequent investigation makes use of data observed over two periods to reveal empirical regularities between WHZ and membership in the PSNP.
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Study context and data
Child malnutrition in Ethiopia
It has long been recognized that under-nutrition is the major cause of child mortality (World Bank 2011). In Ethiopia, child malnutrition contributed to an estimated 57 % of under-five mortality as of 2001 (Mekonnen et al. 2005) , with boys having a higher mortality rate than girls (WHO 2011 
The Productive Safety Net Program
The Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) is a developmentoriented social protection program that was launched in Ethiopia in 2005. It was introduced by joint efforts of the Government of Ethiopia and donors in an attempt to provide a long-term solution to the chronically food insecure households found in chronically food insecure regions of the country. The original program had two phases. The first phase took place between 2005 and 2009 and the second phase occurred between 2010 and 2014. Initially, the program aimed to cover more than 263 weredas (districts) and 5 million people in four major regions of the country, namely Tigray, Amhara, Oromiya and SNNP (Legovini 2006; Gilligan et al. 2009a; Porter and Dornan 2010; Nega et al. 2010; Siyoum 2012) . In 2009, the program was expanded to cover 8.3 million people in 319 weredas by reaching out for pastoralist areas of the country (Siyoum 2012; Rahmato et al. 2013 ). Continuation of the program was expected, but uncertain, as of 2015. While the original program built upon the experiences of an earlier emergency relief program, it had distinct characteristics, as related to its long-term nature, namely by providing a predictable amount of transfers (cash or food) for a predictable period of time (at least five years) (Bishop and Hilhorst 2010) .
Able-bodied adults were required to work five days per month in community infrastructure development in return for food (mainly wheat and cooking oil) or cash. Elderly, disabled, sick or mentally challenged individuals; pregnant and lactating women; and orphaned teenagers received free food or cash without a work requirement. The former constituted the public work (food-for-work or cash-for-work) component and the latter formed the direct support component (Sharp et al. 2006) . Under the public work component, an able bodied household member could work a maximum of 15 days per month. This limit was referred to as the labor cap rule (Berhane et al. 2011a ). Payments were a combination of cash and food in some weredas and a single form of payment in others (Sabates-Wheeler and Devereux 2010).
In the first phase of the program, an adult household member shared his/her transfer from the public works among other members who could not work. In June 2010, a full family targeting rule (FFT) was introduced. This rule considered all family members of PSNP households as beneficiaries of the program. The aim was to increase the benefits gained from the program by taking household size into account. The rule required that able-bodied household members additionally covered the work requirements of other members who were unable to work, subject to the labor cap rule of 20 days per month (Berhane et al. 2011a) .
Program eligibility during the period of study rested on whether a household was found in one of the chronically food insecure weredas; whether it faced food gaps or had received food aid within 3 years of the start of the program; whether it faced severe shocks that led to substantial asset depletion; or whether it had no other source of support (e.g. from family or other social protection programs). Food security task forces (FSTF) and councils formed at community, tabia and wereda levels selected eligible households in the program (Government of Ethiopia 2009; Berhane et al. 2011a) . At the community level, food security task forces were formed for each community (subtabia). These task forces identified households that qualified for the program based on the criteria (poverty status), given the allocated quota for the community.
4 Public meetings were organized to inform the community members and accommodate complaints before the beneficiary list was transferred to the tabia FSTF. The tabia FSTF reviewed the list and submitted it to the wereda FSTF. Then, the wereda FSTF transferred the list to the regional and the regional to the federal office (Berhane et al. 2011a) . Eligible households were then registered as members 2 As argued elsewhere, we do not include a longer-term measure of malnutrition (e.g. height-for-age) in this study primarily because a long-term indicator is not likely to pick up the short-term benefits of the PSNP as measured at the time of the study. Instead, height-for-age scores are more likely to reflect underlying levels of deprivation in the sample, and for this reason are likely to be positively correlated with PSNP eligibility. 3 A child is considered stunted, wasted or underweight if the calculated Zscore for height-for-age, weight-for-height and weight-for-age, respectively, is 2 standard deviations below the median of a reference population. The Z-score is calculated as: Z ¼ observed value−median reference value standard deviation of reference population .
of the program for a consecutive five year period (first phase) and possibly for an additional five years (second phase). 5 The FSTF at each level generally followed the criteria in the project implementation manual, although at all levels targeting was sometimes affected by limited budget (Berhane et al. 2011a; Coll-Black et al. 2011 ). According to Coll-Black et al. (2011) , the main criterion used by local officials in targeting public works beneficiaries was their poverty status. There was a little evidence of favoritism at the community level. The authors reported that PSNP has been targeted well when measured by international standards.
Throughout the time of the study, PSNP formed the core among the four components of the country's food security program (FSP). The FSP also included Complementary Community Investment (CCI) which involved building infrastructure; Other Food Security Program (OFSP) [later transformed into Household Asset Building Package (HABP)] which provided extension services and credit; and a resettlement program that involved voluntary relocation of households in search of better agricultural production (Berhane et al. 2011a; Lavers 2013; Rahmato et al. 2013) . Along with the HABP, the PSNP aimed to allow households to accumulate assets and to avoid asset depletion due to severe shocks. Together with these complementary programs, the PSNP aimed to achieve graduation of beneficiary households out of the program, and at the time of writing, it appeared that many PSNP households were positioned to graduate from the program. Graduating households were expected to show sufficient improvement in food security status and asset accumulation (Government of Ethiopia 2009).
Study site and data
Data for this study came from household surveys collected in Tigray, a region in Northern Ethiopia typically characterized by high exposure to recurrent drought and famine (Hagos 2003) . Further, most households have limited access to credit and off-farm opportunities (Bezu and Holden 2008) . The malnutrition status of children under five in Tigray is among the worst in the country. In 2000, 61.3 % of children were stunted, the second largest percentage in the nation after the Amhara region (62.9 %). During the same period, the percentages of wasted and underweight children were 12.9 and 42.3, respectively (WHO 2012).
Our data were collected in 2006 and 2010. The data are part of a follow up survey that initially visited 400 rural households in 1998 and then revisited them in 2001 and 2003. The initial sample was collected using a stratified random sampling method from 16 villages, 25 households within each village. Selected villages were representative of the region in terms of agro-climatic conditions, agricultural potential, population density and market access (Hagos 2003) . Data were collected by hired enumerators who spoke the local language. The main instruments used in the survey were multipurpose household questionnaires and village questionnaires. The household questionnaire contained topics on household characteristics; asset ownership (livestock, land and physical assets); membership of the PSNP; income from agricultural and non agricultural sources; exposure to shocks and anthropometric measures for children and parents. Survey data in 2006 and 2010 included child anthropometric measures for the first time. The 2010 data further contained height and weight of the parents and an additional 119 households from two different villages. 6 We used pooled cross-section data from 2006 and 2010 at child level. Only 37 of the children were included in both surveys, so we treated each round as a separate representative sample. 7 We generated Z-score values for weight-for-height of children under five using WHO's latest child growth standard (2006) . The newly developed growth standard incorporates the growth pattern of children with different ethnic and cultural backgrounds which makes it suitable for data coming from developing countries. This is unlike the earlier National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS)/WHO growth standard (O'Donnell et al. 2008 ). The Z-score values reflect the standard deviation from the median height or weight of WHO's well-nourished reference population (with same age and gender).
8 Anthropometric surveys of children typically suffer from problems of missing data or mismeasurement. After removing missing and outlier observations, our sample included 383 children less than five years of age: 187 for 2006 and 196 for 2010. We classified households in our sample according to whether or not they were members of the PSNP. We then conducted our analysis comparing outcomes for children from these two groups. Table 1 presents the proportions of malnourished children by age category, gender and membership in the PSNP. Acute malnutrition (wasting), which is indicated by low WHZ, seems to be more of a problem for children above two years (see column 1). In our sample, approximately 16 % of children below two years and 19 % of children above two years were wasted (WHZ < −2.0). Overall, 18 % of children in our sample were wasted. In terms of sex, our sample indicates a greater share of boys with WHZ scores lower than 2 standard deviations below the reference population (see column 1 in Table 1 ). This is in line with Christiaensen and Alderman (2004) who found boys more malnourished than girls in their data for Ethiopia. Table 1 also shows the percentages of children who were malnourished within households that were members and non-members in the PSNP. The proportion of wasted children in member households (16 %) is lower than in non-member households (23 %). Columns 3 and 4 show similar patterns for 2006 and 2010 (see Table 1 ). An exception is that the proportion of wasted girls was higher than the proportion of wasted boys in 2006. Table 2 summarizes average WHZ among children in PSNP and non-PSNP households. Short-term nutritional status worsened in both groups between 2006 and 2010, declining from 0.17 in 2006 to −0.66 in 2010. Figure 1 illustrates the pattern. The worsening of WHZ occurred for both member and non-member households. On average, children in PSNP households exhibited higher WHZ than children in non-beneficiary households. Figure 2 compares the Z-score distributions for members and non-members. Cumulative density functions for WHZ are plotted in Fig. 3 . These underscore that the distribution for PSNP households is shifted to the right, and dominates the non-PSNP distribution at nearly all points.
Empirical strategy
Our main focus in this paper is to examine differences in the nutritional outcome of children in households that are members in the PSNP and those that are not. We first examined the differences in the determinants of WHZ within PSNP and non-PSNP households. Then, we measured the impact of the PSNP on the nutrition outcome of member households' children. Membership of the PSNP was outside the control of households, which makes an exogenous switching regression suitable for our purposes.
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The theoretical framework suggests labor reallocation decisions of member households may differ from those of nonmember households. An implication is that child health may differ in member and non-member households. A Chow test in our sample rejects the null hypothesis of coefficient equality for members and non-members (at a 0.1 % test level). This confirms that an exogenous switching regression, which allows coefficient estimates to differ across the sub-samples, is appropriate. Estimating separate slope coefficients for the two groups also enables us to measure the differential impacts of child and household covariates on the outcome variable of interest.
Using the child as the unit of analysis, the regression models for the two groups are defined as follows:
where subscripts M and N for the dependent and the explanatory variables represent PSNP membership and non-membership. Subscript i denotes child level variables and subscript h denotes household level variables. Z i denotes anthropometric measures of the child (weight-for-height Z-score); X i is a vector of child characteristics (gender and age of the child); X h is a vector of household characteristics (age, gender and education of the household head; number of female and male adult labor; number of other siblings under five); A h refers to a vector of productive assets (including land area and livestock holdings); T is a year dummy variable (T=1 if the year is 2010 and zero if the year is 2006); and ε i is an error term with expected value of zero. In the estimation, ε Mi and ε Ni are assumed to be uncorrelated with unobservable factors affecting membership in PSNP, a requirement in an exogenous switching regression model (Maddala 1983) . In order to Number of observations in parentheses.
9 Following Duflo (2003), we focused on membership rather than participation. We tested exogeneity of membership in two ways. First, following a similar approach to that used by Yamano et al. (2005) we employed 2SLS using the deflated village average income from FFW in 1998 as our identifying instrument for PSNP membership. Although the instrument was weak, the test recommended rejecting the hypothesis that membership is endogenous in the Z-score regression. Second, we used the same instrument in an endogenous switching regression, subsequently checking the significance of the correlation between the error term in the membership equation and the error term in the Z-score regression. The estimated coefficient was not statistically different from zero, again suggesting that PSNP membership is exogenous to nutrition outcomes. Tables 3 and 4 show these results.
control for time-invariant unobservable characteristics, we use household fixed effects. One of the shortcomings of our study is that we were unable to control for time-varying unobservable characteristics of households. White's hetroskedasticity corrected standard errors were clustered by wereda.
In order to directly examine if membership in PSNP contributed to child nutrition, we used two approaches. First, we used predictions from the separate regressions and test differences in predicted outcomes between members and non-members. Kernel density graphs, Kolmogorov Smirnov tests and t-tests were applied. Second, we adopted the approach of Kassie et al. (2014) who computed treatment effects after carrying out an exogenous switching regression. In our case this involved generating the average value of the observed outcome (WHZ) for PSNP and non-PSNP sub-samples, as well as those derived under plausible counterfactual conditions. A reasonable counterfactual for PSNP member households is one in which the nutrition outcomes of children reflect the aggregated effects of the observed household characteristics but the marginal nutrition effects for each characteristic observed in the non-member sample regression. Table 5 shows the relations of the observed and counterfactual expected values of health outcomes for PSNP and non-PSNP households. Cells [1] and [5] represent the expectations that are observed for member and non-member households, respectively. P refers to a binary variable taking the value of one for members and zero otherwise. Average treatment on the treated (ATT) is computed as the difference between the average of the observed WHZs and the average of the constructed counterfactual WHZs for member households. This shows the effect of the program on member households and is represented in Cell [3] . Analogously, Cell [6] refers to the average treatment on the untreated (ATU) which is equivalent to the effect of membership on nonmember households if they had had the same returns to their characteristics as member households. Heterogeneity effects, which are defined in cells [7] and [8], measure differences in health outcomes due to unobserved factors. This paper only focuses on PSNP membership and does not take into account the complementary programs HABP, CCI and voluntary resettlement. Controlling for these variables would have captured the combined asset building and labor requirement implications of these programs on child nutrition. An impact evaluation by Gilligan et al. (2009b) showed that the PSNP and OFSP combined generated a greater magnitude of asset accumulation and food security than the PSNP alone. Further, a study by Hoddinott et al. (2012) found that higher payments from PSNP promoted fertilizer use and investment in agriculture when the program was combined with OFSP. On this basis, we expect that findings in this paper are likely to under estimate the impact of the PSNP on child nutrition.
Results
Prior to examining the impact of PSNP on child health, we first discuss the factors that influence the weight-for-height Zscore of children in PSNP and non-PSNP households. Table 6 gives a description of the variables that were used in the regression analysis and Table 7 provides the summary statistics for PSNP and non-PSNP households in each survey round. Tables 8 and 9 report the determinants of children's WHZ in member and non-member households. The parameter estimates in the regressions measure the short-term nutritional status of children (WHZ) attributable to the explanatory variables within the two groups. Models 1A, 1B and 1C contain results for member households and Models 2A, 2B and 2C show results for non-member households. Models 1B and 2B include the number of other under five children in the household. Models 1C and 2C disaggregate the number of other under five children by gender. As the theoretical model predicts, the set of covariates that explain variation in WHZ differ in the PSNP and non-PSNP sub-samples. Findings suggest a lower WHZ for older children in member households. In contrast, the age of a child does not seem to matter to observed outcomes in non-member households. Gender of a child is correlated with WHZ in non-member households. Results indicate that boys in non-member households have 0.89-1.88 higher WHZ than girls, on average. Nonmember households seem to favor boys over girls in the distribution of food within the households. On the other hand, the estimate in Model 1C and signs in Models 1A and 1B show that in member households girls have better WHZ outcomes, on average, than boys. This finding is similar to those from a study by Webb and Block (2004) showing higher WHZ for girls than boys in Indonesia. Using a sample of Ethiopian children, Outes and Porter (2013) also found that girls have higher catchup growth than boys in terms of height-for-age Z-score.
Determinants of weight-for-height Z-score
Female headship seems to be negatively associated with WHZ in non-member households. This may indicate that female-headed households are resource poor and hence less able to generate health improvements than male-headed households. The point estimate for this variable is not statistically significant in the member sample, probably because female-headed households benefit more and are more able to provide food for children. As the age of a non-member household head increases by one year, WHZ decreases by 0.28-0.32 (significant at 1 % level). This potentially relates to the decline in the ability to foster children's better nutritional outcome with age. In the regression for member households, we found no evidence that the age of the household head, on average, is correlated with WHZ.
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Results show that children in non-member households with uneducated household heads have higher WHZ, ceteris paribus. This is contrary to findings in previous studies such as Lavy et al. (1996) and Christiaensen and Alderman (2004) . Our results are, on the other hand, similar to those of Webb and Block (2004) who argue that responses to education vary depending on whether one considers short-term or long-term nutrition indicators. In member households, coefficient estimates for household heads' education were not statistically significant.
In member households one additional female worker is associated with 1.09-1.31 higher WHZ, on average. A plausible explanation is that member households with greater numbers of adult female labourers are in a better position to allocate labor to the public works in the PSNP as well as health production. This is in line with our theoretical model which states that the increase in income from FFW can bring positive health outcomes if labor reallocation from health production is not costly. It seems likely that FFW is particularly important for mobilizing idle female labor while males may have better off-farm opportunities without access to FFW. Put differently, FFW enhances value of the female labor force in the household and this leads to more In response to concerns that difference in significance for the effect of heads' age might point to selection bias, we looked more closely at the age structure of member and non-member households. Summary statistics and kernel-density plots show that the age structure within the two groups is broadly similar. When we repeated our regressions omitting age of the household head, the point estimates for remaining variables were similar to those in the full model. We conclude that differences in the effect of the heads' age on child outcomes can be explained by the benefits that member households receive, and that the PSNP may have had an equilibrating and compensating effect across age cohorts of households.
investment in child health through their FFW income. This may also be related to the fact that women allocate more of their income for fostering children's health (Grote 2014) . A household's labor endowment does not seem to matter in determining child nutrition in non-member households (see Table 9 ).
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Children who have a greater number of siblings under the age of five seem to have higher WHZ in both member and non-member households (see Models 1B and 2B in Tables 8  and 9 , respectively). The marginal effect is higher for nonmember households (0.76) than member households (0.52). As can be seen in Models 1C and 2C, effects differ depending on whether the siblings are boys or girls. The number of brothers positively affects WHZ in non-member households while number of sisters is positively linked with higher WHZ in member households. This is in line with our results on gender, which show that members favor girls and non-members favor boys in health production. In the setting of our study area, girls tend to stay with their mothers while boys are around their fathers. Girls therefore get direct food benefit from their mothers as mothers are responsible for preparing food. In PSNP households, where food payments are available and adult females get direct payments, girls have significantly higher tendency to be better nourished than boys. Further, the value of female children is probably higher in member households due to the ability of adult females to generate income. On the other hand, male children may be better nourished in non-member households as it is mostly the male adults that support the family and investing in boys' health may be more rewarding in the future.
One can observe that WHZ has generally declined for all households between 2006 and 2010. This is possibly due to the high food prices experienced in 2008 (Gilligan et al. 2009b) . Findings are consistent with Gilligan et al. (2009b) who studied the prevalence of wasting in the Amhara region from 2005 and 2008. Thomas et al. (1996) also found that higher food prices led to a significant decline in the shortrun health indicator in Cote d'Ivoire. However, the point estimate for the year indicator is significantly different from zero only in the regression for member households.
Impact of PSNP on weight-for-height Z-score
Is the average WHZ higher for children living in member households than for those in non-member households? Table 10 summarizes the result for a two sample t-test between the predicted values of the separate regressions for the two groups.
12 Results indicate that the average predicted WHZ is significantly higher for children in PSNP households than their non-PSNP cohorts. Tables 8 and 9 showed that the year dummy in member households is significant while it is insignificant in non-member households (though the coefficient is higher in non-member households). An implication from the prediction result is that even after controlling for the time effect, children in member households still have higher WHZ than in non-member households.
13 A two-sample KolmogorovSmirnov test for equality of distribution functions for member and non-member households revealed a statistically significant difference in the conditional distributions (p-value = 0.06) (see Table 10 ). Table 11 presents results for treatment effects of membership. Results are based on the regression analyses reported in tables 8 and 9. Findings in Table 11 are therefore for the combined years of 2006 and 2010. Cells 1 and 5 contain observed WHZ for children of PSNP and non-PSNP households. Cell 2 shows the counterfactual condition for members, i.e. the WHZ value that would have been obtained had members' responses to observed characteristics been the same as that of non-members. Similarly, cell 4 shows the counterfactual value for non-members. Findings reveal that average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is positive and significant at a 1 % level (cell 3). This implies that average WHZ for members is higher than it would have been if the marginal return to their characteristics had been the same as for non-11 Figure 4 shows the observed distribution of adult female labor in member and non-member households. Figure 5 shows the predicted WHZ versus number of adult female labor. It can clearly be seen that the predicted value of WHZ increases with number of adult females in member households confirming the statistically significant result in Models 1A-1C. 12 We use models 1A and 2A to derive predicted values and compute treatment effects. 13 We used a more conservative approach in predicting the outcome by generating the predictions using only the significant variables. This way, we are able to take into account variables that only matter to the outcome variable in each regression. Test results using the new predictions gave an even stronger result showing children in member households have better nutritional status. Member households' characteristics
Non-member households' characteristics
Heterogeneity effects (Row 2-row 3)
members. Results also show that average treatment effect on the untreated (ATU) is statistically insignificant (cell 6). The heterogeneity effects, which are shown in cells 7 and 8, indicate that unobserved factors also contribute to the differences in WHZ between member and non-member households. In general, results show that nutrition outcomes have been responsive to PSNP membership in the short run (Figs. 4 and 5 ).
Conclusion
Using 2006 and 2010 survey data from Northern Ethiopia, we investigated whether the determinants of short-run nutrition outcomes, as measured by weight-for-height, differ between PSNP and non-PSNP households. We also examined whether the PSNP improved child nutrition in households benefiting from the program. Findings indicate that both the magnitude and significance of covariates influencing WHZ differ across the member and non-member samples. We found that female labor supply is positively correlated with WHZ in member households but exhibits no correlation with WHZ in non-member households. We conclude that there is no observable income-nutrition tradeoff when Bunderutilized^female labor is allocated to a FFW program. Although this result is highly-specific to Ethiopia, given its low baseline female labor force participation rate, it nevertheless underscores the potential for FFW programs to improve, not jeopardize, the short-run nutrition outcomes of children. We found that girls are better nourished in member households and boys have higher average WHZ in non-member households. This result, its causes and implications warrant further study.
Results from predictions after exogenous switching regressions show that children in member households had higher WHZ than those in non-member households. We also b *significant at 10 %; ** significant at 5 %; *** significant at 1 % c 1Tsimdi = 0.25 ha Our findings contribute to the impact evaluation literature in two ways. First, we demonstrated not only the existence of a short-run PSNP impact on child nutrition, but also cast light on one potential mechanism that seems to drive the result. As Deaton (2010) argues, uncovering the factors that explain why an impact exists is a necessary task to inform policy. In this paper we have suggested one way to do so, providing evidence One of the key policy implications that emerges from our findings, therefore, is that employment opportunities for under-employed women not only improve their incomes, but also improve child nutrition in the short run. Whether longterm nutrition impacts can be generated through continued participation in the program remains an important, but unanswered question. 
Appendix 1 Theoretical Model
This section presents the theoretical model, which underpins the logic outlined in the theoretical framework. We begin by developing a multi-period dynamic model of household production and consumption in which household health evolves as a stock. As a simple starting point, we assume a unitary household in which household members make decisions, including those that affect child nutrition, jointly.
14 The representative household maximizes a discounted stream of utility, defined over consumption, subject to the technology of production and the evolution in stocks of human and physical capital. The problem can be written as:
where C t is a vector containing consumption of food, manufactured goods and health; I t is the income of the household; and S t. represents savings. Equations (5) and (6) represent labor constraints for each gender category where subscripts b and d refer to male and female labor, respectively. L is the total labor endowment;
and L H t represent labor allocated to agricultural production, off-farm work, food-for-work (FFW) and health, respectively. Gender disaggregation of the labor force endowment is important because household health outcomes may vary depending on whether new activities require the (re)allocation of male or female labor. As off-farm employment is generally unavailable or greatly limited for women in Tigray, we assume in equation (6) that female labor cannot be allocated to off-farm Standard errors in parenthesis ** significant at 5 % and *** significant at 1 % 14 The assumption of a unitary household is a strong one. However, using a bargaining household model would quickly complicate our modelling approach and would not enable us to easily show the mechanism through which PSNP affects child nutrition.
employment. Q t is an agricultural production function which is increasing in labor and stock of land and non-land productive assets (A t ) and decreasing in negative shocks that affect production (η); P t refers to the price of a composite agricultural product; w o t and w F t are wages from off-farm employment and food-forwork, respectively. The dynamic system is governed by two equations of motion, one for physical capital (equation (8)) and one for human capital (equation (10)). A t appreciates at the rate r and can be augmented through savings. Of course, the stock of land may depreciate from degradation and the stock of animals may depreciate from disease. The household's stock of human capital is represented as an aggregate index of health, H t , which evolves subject to previous health status (H t-1 ) and improvements in health generated through the health production function [h (•)]. We assume the health production function is concave in its arguments and depends on the labor allocated to health (child care) and the current level of consumption (C t ). In subsequent modeling, we consider child health to be part of H t .
2Substitution of equation (7) into equation (8); equation (8) into equation (4) and equation (4) into the objective function yields the following fixed-horizon optimization problem:
Sub jectto :
A t − A t−1 ¼ r A t−1 þ S t ð14Þ
The choice variables in the problem are L Accounting for the constraints on the choice variables, the dynamic Lagrangian associated with the problem is:
The first-order necessary conditions (FOC) with respect to labor allocated to health and FFW for male labor are given by equation (17) 
Solving equations (17) and (18) for male labor and equations (19) and (20) for female labor results in a pair of equations that illustrate the potential connections between a program like Ethiopia's PSNP and nutrition outcomes. Equations (21) and (22) 
